Yen carry trades have traditionally been viewed in narrow terms purely as a foreign exchange transaction. However, evidence from the waxing and waning of balance sheets of foreign banks operating in Japan points to a broader notion of the carry trade. Yen liabilities fund not only pure currency carry trades, but also fund the general increase in balance sheets of hedge funds and financial intermediaries. The difference in overnight rates across countries is a crucial determinant of balance sheet changes. Domestic monetary policy thus has a global dimension.
Introduction
A carry trade is constructed by borrowing a low interest rate currency to fund the purchase of a high interest rate currency -that is, in selling currencies forward that are at a signi…cant forward premium. The "yen carry trade" in particular has been a topical subject of debate over the last decade or more given the extended period of low interest rates in Japan.
Although the carry trade is often portrayed purely as a bet on the foreign exchange markets, the signi…cance of the carry trade extends far beyond the narrow con…nes of the FX market, and arguably extends into all reaches of the global …nancial system. The key to understanding the wider signi…cance of the carry trade is to follow the trail of leveraged bets through the …nancial system through interlocking balance sheets of the …nacial intermediaries involved. Take an example. A hedge fund that wishes to take on a larger position in a security obtains funding from its prime broker (a Wall Street investment bank, say) by pledging assets in a repurchase agreement (a "repo"). The prime broker, for its part, funds the loan to the hedge fund by borrowing from another party. But who lends to the Wall Street bank and at what rate?
If the Wall Street bank borrows in New York, it will pay a rate closely tied to the short term US Dollar interbank rate. However, if it were to borrow in Tokyo, and in Japanese Yen, it can borrow at the much lower yen overnight rate.
A bank with global reach can borrow yen through its Tokyo o¢ ce. The Tokyo o¢ ce of the Wall Street bank then has yen liabilities to Japanese banks, but has yen assets against its New York head o¢ ce. The lending by the Japan o¢ ce of the Wall Street bank to its head o¢ ce is captured in its "intero¢ ce" accounts, and reported to the Bank of Japan. By monitoring the waxing and waning of the intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks in Tokyo, we can gain a valuable window on the overall risk appetite and the workings of the global …nancial system. We …nd that the intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks in Tokyo reveal some important lessons. We focus on three in particular.
Until recently, foreign banks have maintained a net long position in Japanese assets through its intero¢ ce accounts. However, in the period leading up to the credit crisis of 2007, yen liabilities of foreign banks surged, leading to an unprecedented net short position in Japanese assets. We see this surge as bearing the hallmarks of the yen carry trade, interpreted broadly as above.
These net short positions were sharply unwound in August 2007, coinciding with the peak of the credit crisis of 2007.
As found in Adrian and Shin (2007a) for the ‡uctuations in US primary dealer balance sheets, we …nd that the ‡uctuations in the size of the net intero¢ ce accounts is intimately tied to the state of overall risk appetite, as measured by the VIX index of implied volatility on the broader US stock market. The periods when foreign banks have large yen liabilities are also those periods with low readings of the VIX index. This fact gives a clue as to why major global stock indices have been so closely aligned with the exchange rates of high yielding currencies vis-à-vis the yen in recent years.
Finally, we …nd that the di¤erence between the yen overnight rate and a summary measure of overnight rates in developed countries mirrors closely the overall size of the net intero¢ ce accounts. Yen liabilities are high when foreign overnight rates are high relative to overnight rates in Japan.
Conversely, when foreign overnight rates are close to Japanese rates, foreign banks have low yen liabilities. During the period of exceptionally low US interest rates in 2002 to 2004, foreign banks maintained low yen liabilities, suggesting that they could satisfy their funding needs by borrowing in US dollars without tapping the yen market.
This last bullet point holds potentially important lessons for monetary policy.
Although monetary policy is conducted primarily with domestic macroeconomic conditions in mind, there are inevitable global spillovers of monetary policy. In recent years, with the advent of formal in ‡ation-targeting and moves toward greater focus on managing market expectations of future central bank actions, attention has shifted away from short term rates as an important price variable in its own right. Our preliminary …ndings suggest that short term rates and balance sheet size may be important in their own right for the conduct of monetary policy.
The outline of our paper is as follows. We begin with a review of the institutional background of the intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan and chart the shifts in the balance sheet composition of foreign banks over time. We chart the ‡uctuations in the intero¢ ce accounts, and highlight the surge in yen liabilities immediately preceding the 2007 credit crisis. We then investigate how the ‡uctuations in the net intero¢ ce accounts relate to risk appetite, as measured by the VIX index, and how they relate to the di¤erence between foreign overnight rates and the yen interest rate. We conclude with some tentative observations on the implications of our …ndings for monetary policy.
Institutional Background
Our focus is the chain of balance sheet interconnections that link a global …nancial intermediary with sources of yen funding. The stylized chain is depicted in …gure 2.1.
A Wall Street bank can tap short-term yen funds through its o¢ ce in Japan by borrowing in the yen interbank market. Some of these funds will be lent on In the left hand panel, the net intero¢ ce account (intero¢ ce assets intero¢ ce liabilities) is negative, meaning that the Wall Street bank holds a net long position in Japanese assets.
The right hand panel of …gure 2.2 shows the incresed channeling of yen funds to the New York head o¢ ce via the intero¢ ce account. The Japan o¢ ce borrows more yen (increases call money), and then lends on the proceeds to the New York headquarters through increased intero¢ ce assets. In the illustration in the right hand panel, the net intero¢ ce account becomes positive, re ‡ecting the larger onlending to the New York o¢ ce. Such a position is tantamount to a net short position in Japanese assets, and can be seen as part of the broad yen carry trade. Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07
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A First Look at the Data

Total Assets of Foreign Banks in Japan
Before going to our key plots, we …rst plot the total assets of foreign banks in Japan in …gure 3.1. Total assets of foreign banks increased rapidly in the late 90s, and have stayed high since. Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 
Broad Yen Carry Trade
We now focus on the key series. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot, respectively, the aggregate interbank assets of foreign banks in Japan ("call loan") and the aggregate interbank liabilities of foreign banks in Japan ("call money"). Call loans have ‡uctuated over the years, and were low in the early part of the decade when US interest rates were exceptionally low. Call money (yen liabilities) have ‡uctuated even more, with a surge in the period after 2004, when the US interbank rate was rising. Note that the scale is di¤erent in the two series, so that the surge in yen liabilities is larger than at …rst meets the eye.
As a result of the surge in yen liabilities, the net interbank position of foreign banks becomes sharply negative in the most recent period, beginning in 2006 (see …gure 3.5). However, the critical piece in the jigsaw puzzle is the stance on the intero¢ ce account. In order to conclude that the surge in yen liabilities is associated with the broad yen carry trade, we need to verify that the increased yen Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07
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Date 100 billion yen The crucial piece of evidence is therefore the net intero¢ ce accounts, as presented in …gure 3.6.
As previously discussed, the net intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks have normally been negative, implying that foreign banks have held a net long position in Japanese assets. In the period of the "Japan premium" (roughly 1997 to 1998) foreign banks held large net long positions in Japanese assets, given their funding advantage over Japanese rivals handicapped by the Japan premium. of foreign banks against the monthly change in the net interbank assets (call loan call money) of foreign banks from 1999. If our hypothesis is correct that the ‡uctuations in yen liabilities re ‡ect the broad yen carry trade, then the points on the scatter chart should be negatively sloped. The slope of the relationship would depend on the degree to which the yen liabilities of the foreign banks'Japan o¢ ce merely re ‡ects the channeling of yen to uses outside Japan. If the slope is 1, then there is a one-for-one relationship between increases in yen interbank liabilities and yen intero¢ ce accounts, suggesting that changes in yen liabilities re ‡ect the broad yen carry trade. If the slope has a lower absolute value, then the ‡uctuations in yen interbank liabilities would re ‡ect other motives for borrowing yen (such as funding the purchase of Japanese securities)
In the scatter chart, we see, indeed, that the relationship is strongly negative.
The slope of the OLS regression is 0:89.
2 Thus, the slope is reasonably close to 1, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the Japan o¢ ces of the foreign banks play the role of channeling yen liquidity out of Japan in the broad yen carry trade.
The evidence focuses attention on the question of how such yen funding has been used by the headquarters o¢ ces of the foreign banks. At this point, the trail becomes murkier, but it would be a reasonable conjecture (to be veri…ed through other evidence) that the increased yen funding has either been recycled for use by the customers of the foreign banks in their home markets (e.g. hedge funds), or have funded the broad yen carry trade on the bank's own books (e.g. through its
proprietary trading desk).
We have focused on the yen interbank for evidence of the broad carry trade, but there are other means through which foreign institutions can raise funding in Japan, such as the issuance of "Samurai bonds" -i.e. yen-denominated bonds issued by non-residents, especially when the issuer is a foreign bank. A more comprehensive study of the carry trade would need to take account of such alternative funding sources.
Carry Trades and Risk Appetite
We now examine the wider implications of the carry trade. Our focus is on the implications of expansions of balance sheets for the appetite for risk. In a …nancial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to market, changes in asset prices show up immediately on the balance sheet, and so have an immediate impact on the net worth of all constituents of the …nancial system. The reactions of …nancial intermediaries to such changes in net worth is a critical in ‡uence on overall market risk appetite.
If …nancial intermediaries were passive and did not adjust their balance sheets to changes in net worth, then leverage would fall when total assets rise. Change in leverage and change in balance sheet size would then be negatively related.
However, as documented by Adrian and Shin (2007a) , the evidence points to a strongly positive relationship between changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet size. Far from being passive, …nancial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets actively, and doing so in such a way that leverage is high during booms and low during busts.
Procyclical leverage can be seen as a consequence of the active management of balance sheets by …nancial intermediaries who respond to changes in prices and measured risk. For …nancial intermediaries, their models of risk and economic capital dictate active management of their overall value at risk (VaR) through adjustments of their balance sheets. Credit ratings are a key determinant of their cost of funding, and they will attempt to manage key …nancial ratios so as to hit their credit rating targets.
From the point of view of each …nancial intermediary, decision rules that result in procyclical leverage are readily understandable. However, there are aggregate consequences of such behavior for the …nancial system as a whole that are not taken into consideration by an individual …nancial intermediary. Such behavior has aggregate consequences on overall …nancial conditions, risk appetite and the ampli…cation of …nancial cycles. In order to appreciate the aggregate consequences of pro-cyclical leverage, let us consider the behavior of a …nancial intermediary that manages its balance sheet actively so as to maintain a constant leverage ratio of 10. Suppose the initial balance sheet is as follows. The …nancial intermediary holds 100 worth of securities, and has funded this holding with debt worth 90. The solution is D = 9. The bank takes on additional debt worth 9, and with this money purchases securities worth 9. Thus, an increase in the price of the security of 1 leads to an increased holding worth 9. The demand curve is upward-sloping.
After the purchase, leverage is now back up to 10.
Assets Liabilities Securities, 110 Equity, 11
Debt, 99
The mechanism works in reverse, too. Suppose there is shock to the securities price so that the value of security holdings falls to 109. On the liabilities side, it is equity that bears the burden of adjustment, since the value of debt stays approximately constant.
Assets Liabilities Securities, 109 Equity, 10
Leverage is now too high (109=10 = 10:9). The bank can adjust down its leverage by selling securities worth 9, and paying down 9 worth of debt. Thus, a fall in the price of securities of leads to sales of securities. The supply curve is downwardsloping. The new balance sheet then looks as follows. The balance sheet is now back to where it started before the price changes. Leverage is back down to the target level of 10.
Leverage targeting entails upward-sloping demands and downward-sloping supplies. The perverse nature of the demand and supply curves are even stronger when the leverage of the …nancial intermediary is pro-cyclical -that is, when leverage is high during booms and low during busts. When the securities price goes up, the upward adjustment of leverage entails purchases of securities that are even larger than that for the case of constant leverage. If, in addition, there is the possibility of feedback, then the adjustment of leverage and price changes will reinforce each other in an ampli…cation of the …nancial cycle. If we hypothesize that greater demand for the asset tends to put upward pressure on its price (a plausible hypothesis, it would seem), then there is the potential for a feedback e¤ect in which stronger balance sheets feed greater demand for the asset, which The mechanism works exactly in reverse in downturns. If we hypothesize that greater supply of the asset tends to put downward pressure on its price, then there is the potential for a feedback e¤ect in which weaker balance sheets lead to greater sales of the asset, which depresses the asset's price and lead to even weaker balance sheets. Figure 4 .4 illustrates the feedback during a downturn.
For these reasons, it would be important to draw a distinction between the capital out ‡ows from Japan due to the carry trades by …nancial intermediaries and the out ‡ows due to the household sector's purchase of foreign assets, or the diversifaction of the portfolios of institutions such as mutual funds and life insurance companies that are not leveraged, or have minimal leverage. Indeed, the purchase of foreign currency assets for these entities should not be seen as part of the broad yen carry trade we have discussed so far. In contrast, the most important marginal players are the …nancial intermediaries whose ‡uctuating balance sheets determine overall …nancial market liquidity conditions.
Aggregate liquidity can be understood as the rate of growth of aggregate bal-ance sheets. When …nancial intermediaries'balance sheets are generally strong, their leverage is too low. The …nancial intermediaries hold surplus capital, and they will attempt to …nd ways in which they can employ their surplus capital.
In a loose analogy with manufacturing …rms, we may see the …nancial system as having "surplus capacity". For such surplus capacity to be utilized, the intermediaries must expand their balance sheets. On the liabilities side, they take on more short-term debt. On the asset side, they search for potential borrowers that they can lend to. It is in this context that the broad yen carry trade comes into sharper focus. By allowing intermediaries to expand their balance sheets at lower cost, the broad carry trade fuels the …nancial boom. Aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the …nancial intermediaries search for borrowers. In the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States we have seen that when balance sheets are expanding fast enough, even borrowers that do not have the means to repay are granted credit -so intense is the urge to employ surplus capital. The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit cycle are thus sown. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) show from their study of Spanish banks that the loans granted during booms have higher default rates than those granted during leaner times. Adrian and Shin (2007a) have shown that balance sheet changes are closely related to the overall market risk appetite, as measured by the VIX index of implied volatility of stocks. In the context of the broad yen carry trade, it would be reasonable to conjecture that something similar holds, too. More worryingly, the unwinding of these large net interbank assets to return the system to its historical norm will undoubtedly have adverse aggregate consequences.
Carry Trades and Monetary Policy
Given the importance of balance sheet ‡uctuations for overall risk appetite and their spillover e¤ects for the economy as a whole, the role of the carry trade in facilitating or amplifying the balance sheet ‡uctuations make it a prime concern for monetary authorities. We examine the determinants of the size of the yen carry trade, especially the role of the short term interest rate.
The important role played by the overnight rate can be gleaned from the relationship between the extent of the broad yen carry trade and the interest rate di¤erential between Japan and other developed countries. Figure 5 .1 charts the net intero¢ ce accounts with the di¤erence between the overnight rates in Japan An OLS regression has a t-statistic of 7:8.
The importance of the interest rate di¤erential also …gures in theoretical models of the carry trade (see Plantin and Shin (2006) ). The carry element combined with a procylical leverage ratio (illustrated in the previous section) serve to increase the spillover e¤ects of one currency speculator's actions on others, making speculative trading strategic complements. The carry element turns out to be crucial in this regard. Without the carry element, speculators'actions are strategic substitutes.
Our empirical …ndings suggest that the overnight rate set by central banks 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined the broader implications of the yen carry trade for risk appetite and …nancial cycles. Although the yen carry trade has traditionally been viewed in narrow terms purely as a foreign exchange transaction, we have argued that they hold broader implications for the workings of the …nancial system and for monetary policy. The evidence from the waxing and waning of balance sheets of foreign banks operating in Japan points to a broader notion of the carry trade. Yen liabilities fund not only pure currency carry trades, but also fund the general increase in balance sheets of hedge funds and …nancial intermediaries.
Finally, we have shown that the di¤erence in overnight rates across countries is a crucial determinant of balance sheet changes. Therefore, the short term interest rate may be more important as a gauge of the stance of monetary policy than is given credit for by many leading monetary economists. Domestic monetary policy has a global dimension through the workings of the global …nancial system.
